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Abstract— Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) attempts to find 
cryptographic protocols resistant to attacks using Shor’s 
polynomial time algorithm for numerical field problems or 
Grover’s search algorithm. A mostly overlooked but valuable line 
of solutions is provided by non-commutative algebraic structures, 
specifically canonical protocols that rely on one-way trapdoor 
functions (OWTF). Here we develop an algebraic framework 
who could be applied to different asymmetric protocols like D-H 
KE (Diffie-Hellman key exchange), Public Key Encryption, 
Digital Signature, ZKP (zero-knowledge proof) authentication, 
Oblivious Transfer, Multi-Party Computing, and so on. The 
trapdoor one-way functions selected are (a) Triple decomposition 
Problem (TDP) developed by Kurt, where a known element is 
factored into a product of three unknown factors and (b) a new 
version of conjugacy search that we refer from now on as Blind 
Conjugacy Search Problem (BCSP). Our platform structure is 
the general linear group (, ) d-square non-singular 
matrices of prime field values. In our case, we use p=251 (the 
biggest prime fitting into a byte) and d=8. We give support to the 
fact that this framework is cryptographically secure against 
classical attacks like linear algebra attacks, length-based attacks, 
side-channel attacks against square (or duplicate) and multiply 
(or sum) algorithm, high sensitivity to pseudo random 
deterministic generators, etc. At same time it is immune against 
quantum attacks (using Grover and Shor), if the size parameters 
are carefully selected. Also, there is no pattern emerging from the 
intermediate computations, and therefore resulting tokens or 
encrypted information is indistinguishable from same size 
random matrices. This feature is a key point to assign semantic 
security to the framework and a way to obtain IND-CCA2 
security. An additional advantage is that all operations fit into 
byte modular arithmetic’s.  
     
Keywords – Post-Quantum Cryptography, Non-Commutative 
Cryptography, General Linear Group, Linear Algebra, Triple 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
ost-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) is a trend that has an 
official NIST status [1,2] and which aims to be resistant to 
quantum computers attacks like Shor [3] and Grover [4] 
algorithms. NIST initiated last year a process to solicit, 
evaluate, and standardize one or more quantum-resistant 
public-key cryptographic algorithms [1]. Particularly Shor 
algorithm provided a quantum way to break asymmetric 
protocols. 
Security of a canonical non-commutative protocol always 
relies his security on a one-way trapdoor function (OWTF) [5]. 
For instance, in an algebraic context, the conjugacy search 
problem, decomposition problem, double coset problem, triple 
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decomposition problem, factorization search problem, 
commutator based or simultaneous conjugacy search problem.  
All are hard problems assumed to belong to AWPP time-
complexity (but out of BQP) [6] which yield convenient 
computational security against current quantum attacks. 
More information about post-quantum cryptography (PQC), 
non-commutative cryptography (NCC) and non-associative 
cryptography (NAC) could be found in published works 
[7,8,9,10,11,12,13]. 
2. THE PLATFORM GROUP: 	(
, ) 
The algebraic platform uses the general linear group, non-
singular modular matrices of d-dimension. 
Let p be a prime, d any integer >1, q=pd and Fp[x] the 
polynomial extension of the prime field Fp. The number of 
square matrices of order d and values in Fp is p
d^2, and of those 
pd^2-d are nilpotent [14]. The number of elements in the general 
linear group of d-order non-singular square matrices is: 
 
	
,  =  ∏ ( − 

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A non-singular matrix or d-order whose monic characteristic 
polynomial is irreducible in Fp, generates a cyclic (thus 
commutative) subgroup Pd   of   = 	
, . Each d-degree 
irreducible polynomial f(x) in Fp[x] field has a square 
companion matrix of d-order who acts as a generator of the 
multiplicative cyclic subgroup Pd, and each member of this 
subgroup corresponds to a unique monic characteristic 
polynomial of at most d-1 degree [14]. The  number of non-
trivial (null or unitary) monic d-degree f(x) over F251 field is: 
 
                =   –  2                       (2) 
 
Using Möbius " function, the Np(d) number of monic 
irreducible d-degree polynomials over Fp[x] field is:  
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To generate a random d-order monic irreducible polynomial 
over Fp[x], we use the probabilistic Algorithm 4.70 [15] whose 
complexity is O(m3(lg m)(lg p)) and requires approximately d-
trials. Once found, it is translated into the companion matrix. It 
is of interest to find its order, because that would be the number 
of elements of the commutative subgroup Pd of the Md  matrix 
group. Whatever this value is, it must be a divisor of the 
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multiplicative subfield order (= pd - 1) and if it were maximal, 
the irreducible polynomial would be a primitive one. To 
calculate polynomial orders, a modified version of Algorithm 
4.77 [15] can be used.  
Using an irreducible polynomial in an extension field is a 
method of generating a Pd commutative subgroup of the non-
singular modular square matrices, but there exists another way 
to achieve the same goal. For matrices, the necessary and 
sufficient condition for two symmetric (diagonalizable) 
matrices to commute, is that they share the same orthonormal 
basis, that means the same eigenvectors P matrix [16]. If we 
start from two different diagonal matrices with strictly positive 
eigenvalues D1, D2; then the transformed A =P
-1 D1 P   and   B 
= P-1 D2  P  commute. The later approach is computational 
much faster than the first one, so it is followed in our 
framework. 
For the p=251, d=8 example, the involved cardinals are 
depicted at Table I. 
     TABLE I 
PARTICULAR SETS SIZES 
 
Set Cardinal 
(mod 251) 8-dim square 
matrices 
3.794182134705598 × 1067 
General Linear Group 
 GL (8, F251) 
3.779005647067214 × 1067 
Singular (mod 251) 8-dim 
square matrices 
1.517648763838442 × 106 
 
To generate a GL (8, F251) matrix, a random (mod 251) 8-
dim matrix is obtained and rejected if its determinant were null, 
which occurs in about 4% of the cases, a new random matrix is 
found. The same non-singularity control is applied before 
attempting any further matrix inversion in the protocol, as 
shown in the APPENDIX I source code.  
3. OWTF: TRIPLE DECOMPOSITION PROBLEM (TDP) 
 
As usual, [a,b]=a-1b-1ab,  is the multiplicative commutator 
of a,b. The TDP protocol, is stated as follows.  
 
TDP protocol: 
Given a G group (or monoid) and two sets of five subsets of 
G, say A={A1, A2, A3, X1, X2} and B={B1, B2, B3, Y1, Y2}, 
satisfying the following conditions: 
(Invertibility conditions} The elements of X1, X2, Y1, Y2 are 
invertible. 
(Commutativity conditions) [A2,Y1]= [A3,Y2]= [B1,X1]= 
[B1,X1]= [B2,X2]= I (identity) 
Alice and Bob agree on who will use which sets of subsets, 
say Alice uses A and Bob uses B. Then the exchange between 
both goes as follows: 
(1) Alice chooses a1 e  A1, a2 e  A2, a3 e  A3, x1 e  X1, x2  e  X2, 
and computes u=a1 x1, v=x1
-1 a2 x2, and w=x2
-1 a3. Her 
private key is (a1, a2, a3). 
(2) Bob chooses b1  e  B1, b2  e  B2, b3  e  B3, y1  e  Y1, y2   e  Y2, 
and computes p=b1 y1, q=y1
-1 b2 y2, and r=y2
-1 b3. His 
private key is (b1, b2, b3). 
(3) Alice sends the public key (u, v, w) to Bob. 
(4) Bob sends the public key (p, q, r) to Alice. 
(5) Alice computes 
KA=a1pa2qa3r=a1(b1 y1)a2(y1
-1 b2 y2)a3(y2
-1 b3)=a1b1a2b2a3b3 
(6) Bob computes 
KB=ub1vb2wb3=(a1 x1)b1(x1
-1 a2 x2)b2(x2
-1 a3)b3= a1b1a2b2a3b3 
 
Computational TDP:  
Given the TDP protocol, compute any component of 
Alice’s (or Bob’s) private key (k1, k2, k3) given her (or his) 
public key (x, y, z). 
 
The Yesem Kurt TDP protocol is fully described in [17]. We 
use the Protocol I there described as we found it better fitted to 
our platform.  
4. O WTF: BLIND CONJUGACY SEARCH PROBLEM (BCSP) 
 
The computational Conjugacy Search Problem (CSP) is: 
 
Computational CSP: 
Given G, a non-abelian group with solvable word problem 
and given two elements a, b e  G,   find at least one element 
x e  G such that a = x-1 b  x. 
 
From this problem we derive a stronger one, the 
computational Blind Conjugacy Search Problem (BCSP) as 
follows: 
 
Computational BCSP: 
Given G, a non-abelian group with solvable word problem 
and given any element a e G, and an unknown element b e  
G, find at least one element x e  G such that a = x-1 b  x. 
 
The additional challenge here is to find a conjugator ignoring 
the conjugated element. Any time two entities share a common 
key element of a group, if that key is used as a conjugator, it can 
be used to hide (or encrypt) any other conjugated element. In 
our TDP based framework, we use the shared key as conjugator 
for any matrix encoded plain text. 
 
 
5. STEP-BY-STEP DESCRIPTION 
 
We present a combined D-H and BCSP cipher protocol, the 
only difference between both lies at the last step added. 
In our version, we work with two entities (Alice and Bob), 
but this could be easily generalized for any number of 
participants. All arithmetic operations should be assumed 
belonging to field (6.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
TABLE II 
SYMBOLS AND DEFINITIONS. 
 
 
 
TABLE III 
PUBLIC SETUP STEPS 
 
 
 
TABLE IV 
PRIVATE PROCEDURES 
 
 
 
TABLE V  
PRIVATE KEYS 
 
 
 
TABLE VI  
PUBLIC KEYS 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE VII  
COMMON D-H SESSION KEY 
 
 
 
TABLE VIII  
ADDITIONAL ENCRYPTION STEP (BCSP PROTECTED) 
 
 
 
It is easy to apply the same framework to other asymmetric 
protocols. For example, defining power-sets of matrices, a 
straightforward ElGamal solution is at hand. Also, extending 
the GL() to a polynomial ring,  a Maze et al.  protocol could be 
implemented [8]. Changing of purpose, a ZKP authentication 
protocol, a Baumslag et al. KEM (key encapsulation 
mechanism) or a Digital Signature is almost trivial to design [9]. 
When powers of matrices are used new kind of weakness could 
appear, the multiplicative order of the elements should be 
sufficiently high to foil brute-force attacks. One could use 
companion matrices of primitive polynomials as generators of 
high order subgroups. Comparing different canonical 
approaches, the BCSP application of this framework offer a 
reasonable compromise solution between cryptographic 
security and fast computation. 
At APPENDIX I we present a standard Mathematica source 
code and the running results (on a Core i5 PC/2.20GHz). No 
attempt was made to optimize that code and computations are 
only included as a proof of concept. All symbols included there, 
follow here explained conventions.  
 
6. FRAMEWORK SECURITY 
 
Some required properties that the algebraic platform (G) 
should have in order to have an efficient and secure framework 
[8,17], could be resumed here: 
 
9 ≡ 	(8, (6  – selected parameters are d=8 and prime=251   
P8  ⊂  9   – any commutative subgroup 
⊂   – strictly included into 
∈  – belongs to 
∈= – uniform distribution, randomly selected element in 
∀≠  -  strictly positive elements in the list.  

@  , 
A , … – diagonal matrices of eigenvalues with ∀≠ property 
(C … C9 – eigenvalues set, each one mentioned independent from others 
[a,b] – commutator (=a
-1
b
-1
ab) 
I – Identity matrix order 8 
Sel – selects or reserves for her/him with agreement of the other party. 
⟹    send publicly to the other entity 
validation – greyed field means a consistency proof 
Public parameters 
(any entity 
defines) 
 
Subgroups {A1,A2,A3,X1,X2} ⊂  9 
Subgroups {B1,B2,B3,Y1,Y2} ⊂  9  
Eigenvectors P assigned to A2, Y1 ;  [A2,Y1]=I 
Eigenvectors Q assigned to A3, Y2 ;  [A3,Y2]=I 
Eigenvectors R assigned to B1, X1 ;  [B1,X1]=I 
Eigenvectors S assigned to B2, X2 ;  [B2,X2]=I 
Eigenvectors matrices EF, G, H, IJ ∈= 9 ⟹ 
 
  ALICE BOB 
Generating private 
elements 
Sel {A1,A2,A3,X1,X2} 
∀≠ C … C9 ∈= ℤ(6
∗  

@( = (C … C9 

@7 = (C … C9 

M = (C … C9 

M( = (C … C9 
N = H
OH ∈ F9 
N( = I
O(I ∈ F9 
 
Sel {B1,B2,B3,Y1,Y2} 
∀≠ C … C9 ∈= ℤ(6
∗  

A = (C … C9 

A( = (C … C9 

P = (C … C9 

P( = (C … C9 
Q = F
R F ∈ F9 
Q( = G
R(G ∈ F9 
 
  ALICE BOB 
Private keys 
S  ∈= 9 
S( = F
@( F 
S7 = G
@7 G 
T = H
A H 
T( = I
A( I 
T7 ∈= 9 
  ALICE BOB 
Public keys 
(tokens) 
U = SN 
V = N S(N( 
W = N(S7 
(u, v, w) ⟹ 
 = TQ 
X = Q T(Q( 
Y = Q( T7  
(p, q, r) ⟹ 
  ALICE BOB 
Private session 
key (K) 
obtained 
Z@[\]^ =
=  S   S( X S7 Y  
ZA_A =
=  U T V T( W T7 
Z@[\]^ =  S  S( X S7 Y =
=  S (T Q S( (Q T( Q(S7 (Q(T7  = 
=  S T S( T(  S7 T7 
ZA_A =   U T V T( W T7
=  (S NT (NS( N( T((N(S7T7  = 
=  S T S( T( S7 T7 
Z@[\]^ = ZA_A ≡   Z   
  ALICE BOB 
BOB 
ciphers a message 
for ALICE 
 `ab ∈ 9  
cde =
= ZA_A
`ab ZA_A  
cde ⟹ 
  ALICE BOB 
ALICE recovers 
the message 
 
`ab =
= Z@[\]^  cde Z@[\]^

 
 
 
`ab = Z@[\]^  cde Z@[\]^
 =
= Z@[\]^ ZA_A
`ab ZA_AZ@[\]^
 = `ab  
 
  
 
I. G should be non-abelian and of exponential growth as 
function of the length of its elements. In our framework, 
G is the general linear group and the  A, B  subgroups 
cardinality growth exponentially as the d-dimension 
parameter increases linearly. 
II. The word problem (determining if an element is or not 
an identity) should be efficiently solved. That achieves 
trivially the matrix framework. 
III. Elements of G should be efficiently represented on a 
computer. This is also trivial in our case. 
IV. Multiplication and inversion of elements should be 
computationally easy within the representation. Again, 
the proposed framework complies it. 
V. If centralizers of generator sets are used, it should be 
hard to solve a decomposition problem presented in 
[17]. In our case, we do not require them.    
 
As shown, our framework fits well into the required settings. 
 
A way to attack the present protocol would be to find a 
probabilistic polynomial time algorithm to solve the algebraic 
triple decomposition problem and the blind conjugacy search 
problem. 
To guarantee that TDP truly rely on non-linear triple 
decomposition, the framework should avoid some pitfalls.  One 
way to attack TDP is to find a pseudo-key that works as a 
private one of any entity [17], which requires solving: 
 
SN = U                                  (4) 
NS(N( = V                                  (5) 
N(S7 = W                                  (6) 
 
Specifically, equation (5) is quadratic in terms of three 
unknowns and this foils linear algebraic attacks. There should 
be paid attention to some cases to be avoided. We resume them 
here. 
 
(a) If [X1,Y1]=I, [X2,Y1]=I and [X2,Y2]=I, then the shared 
key could be computed from the public key. 
(b) If [A2,B1]=I, [A3,B2]=I and [A3,B1]=I, then the shared 
key could be computed from the public key. 
(c) If ([A2,B1]=I and [X2,B1]=I) or ([A3,B2]=I and 
[A3,Y1]=I), then the security of the system relies on the 
difficulty of decomposing an element into two 
unknowns. 
(d) To assure that eq. (5) cannot be linearly reduced, eq. (6) 
should have many solutions. 
(e) In case of the use of generators to define the subgroups 
in the setting, they should be short to foil a length-based 
attack.  
 
More details of these considerations could be found at Kurt’s 
paper [17] and Myasnikov et al. book [8]. In our framework:  
 
(a) Large cardinality of involved sets could be obtained 
selecting appropriate dimensional parameters.  
(b) Commutativity restrictions are accurately followed as 
each eigenvector matrix are independent of others. 
(c) Equation (6) has a very big number of solutions (see 
eq. (7)). 
(d) No generators are used to define the subgroups sets.  
 
Supposing no other weakness at hand, full cracking a private 
key depends on four d-dimensional diagonal eigenvalues 
matrices, so a brute force search of the commutative P8 
subgroups of M8 involves the cardinal 
 
|P8 |
4 =24932 =4.77 x 1076  ≈ 2255                 (7) 
 
For a real-life application, we suggest to use at least P8  or 
perhaps expanding the commutative subgroup to P16, who 
implies a 510-bit level classical security. The corresponding 
quantum security level is the respective square roots of the key 
space cardinals [7]. The obvious drawback is the corresponding 
increase in space, each matrix in {P8, P16} occupies respectively 
{512, 2048} bits. A corresponding computational session time 
should be expected.  
Against quantum-based attacks, the dimensional increase 
foils Grover like attacks and no multiplicative (or additive) 
cyclic order finding adaptation of Shor’s algorithm is known 
and accessible against the present protocol.   
As a final consequence, we infer that our proposed 
framework could be gotten immune against brute-force attacks, 
linear representation attacks, length-based attacks and currently 
known quantum attacks.  
7. SEMANTIC SECURITY 
 
The key point to assure semantic security is the 
indistinguishability of encrypted information from random one 
of same length [5,18,19,20]. 
The presented framework is easily translatable to other 
asymmetric protocols. For this reason, the following security 
analysis is not limited to the present example and can be 
extended in new contexts. To proceed with this analysis, two 
conjectures are exposed. 
 
DEFINITION (D1): interactive challenge-response game by 
a verifier against an active adversary. 
In this three-phase protocol, two entities, an adversary and a 
verifier (or challenger) are involved. The verifier has a secret 
key that he tries to hide from the adversary and allows the 
adversary to pose questions to him that answers truthfully like 
an Oracle. In a first phase, the adversary can raise all the 
questions that he wants to try to obtain information about the 
secret key. In a second phase, the verifier presents the secret key 
(k) to the adversary next to another of equal length and format 
(* k) randomly generated. Even during the second phase, the 
adversary may continue to consult the verifier, except for 
questions linked to the disclosure of the secret itself. In the third 
phase, the adversary has a polynomial time stochastic algorithm 
and must distinguish whether the secret is k or * k, with 
probability negligibly greater than ½. If the opponent achieves 
the distinction with that probability, he wins the game and loses 
it in the opposite case. 
  
 
CONJECTURE (C1): Indistinguishability of product 
transformed random matrices. 
The elements of 	(
, )  are uniformly random integers of 
prime modulus and d-dimension. It is a known fact that sum or 
multiplication between random field integers, does not 
introduce statistical bias into results [21].  Therefore, linear 
transformed matrices are statistically distributed as any random 
generated ones. The consequence is that in an interactive 
challenge-response protocol (Definition D1), an adversary does 
not achieve the distinction raised with the required probability. 
 
CONJECTURE (C2): the present framework adheres to 
semantic security under IND-CCA2. 
The TDP one-way trapdoor function with which the private 
key is protected is, as previous exposed, not weakened by 
attacks of probabilistically polynomial time, whether classical 
or quantum that are in the public domain until today, forcing the 
potential attacker to perform a systematic exploration of the 
private key space (the diagonal matrices). Under this 
assumption and considering the indistinguishability of 
randomly generated matrices and enciphered ones, it is 
reasonable to assign to the framework a security mark 
equivalent to IND-CCA2 (semantic security under IND-CCA2) 
[19,20]. 
8. PREVIOUS WORK  
Some previous work over the same issue was conducted by 
the author along last year’s [22,23,24]. Recently we contributed 
to NIST standardization Program with a Maze et al. protocol 
where the selected platform was based in octonions algebra 
[25]. Unfortunately, it was a bad choice because an algebraic 
attack of Bernstein [26] exposed the octonion’s weakness. This 
shows that even a viable OWTF does not cover against a weak 
platform. Statements like the exposed in 6. Framework Security 
(I. to V.) should be faithfully pursued to achieve an efficient 
asymmetric cryptographic system.  
 
9. CONCLUSIONS 
 
We developed a non-arbitrated algebraic post-quantum 
framework of canonical non-commutative cryptography, which 
could easily be adapted to any other asymmetric purpose.  
Security and computational efficiency were the main 
concerns at developing time. Therefore, TDP was selected as an 
appropriate OWTF for D-H Key Exchange between two 
entities. Once obtained, the common key is used to cipher 
messages between both using a simple transformation protected 
by BCSP, a blind conjugacy problem OWTF. 
Classical and quantum attacks are discussed, and the 
framework seems to be resilient to both. Also, evidence to 
assign semantic security (IND-CCA2) to the framework is 
provided.  Nevertheless, it must be kept attention to any 
appearing cryptanalytic tools against non-commutative 
platforms [27].   
No big number library is required here. This feature would 
enable the use at low computational resources environments 
like smartcards or cryptographic keys. 
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APPENDIX I: Mathematica source code and a step-by-step session 
 
 
NEWLY DEFINED FUNCTIONS 
 
RandomMatrix[dim_,prime_] := Module[{x}, 
     Label[1]; 
     x=Table[Random[Integer,{0,prime-
1}],{i,1,dim},{j,1,dim}]; 
     If[Det[x,Modulusprime]==0,Goto[1],Break];x]; 
RandomDiagonalMatrix[dim_, prime_] :=  
     DiagonalMatrix[Table[Random[Integer,{1,prime-
1}],{i,1,dim}]]; 
InverseMatrix[M_,prime_]:=Inverse[M, 
Modulusprime]; 
ConjugateMatrix[M_,conj_,prime_]:= 
Mod[InverseMatrix[conj,prime].M.conj,prime]; 
M[X_]:=MatrixForm[X]; 
 
COMBINED D-H AND CIPHER SESSION 
 
RandomSeed; 
TimesToRepeat=1000; 
dim=8; 
prime=251; 
trials=0; 
{T0=TimeUsed[],Do[ 
   { 
    Module[{}, 
      Label[begin]; 
      trials +=1; 
      P=RandomMatrix[dim,prime]; 
      Q=RandomMatrix[dim,prime]; 
      R=RandomMatrix[dim,prime]; 
      S=RandomMatrix[dim,prime]; 
      dA2=RandomDiagonalMatrix[dim,prime]; 
      dA3=RandomDiagonalMatrix[dim,prime]; 
      dX1=RandomDiagonalMatrix[dim,prime]; 
      dX2=RandomDiagonalMatrix[dim,prime]; 
      x1=ConjugateMatrix[dX1,R,prime]; 
      x2=ConjugateMatrix[dX2,S,prime]; 
      If[Det[x1.x2, 
Modulusprime]==0,Goto[begin],nil;]; 
      a1=RandomMatrix[dim,prime]; 
      a2=ConjugateMatrix[dA2,P,prime]; 
      a3=ConjugateMatrix[dA3,Q,prime]; 
      If[Det[a1.a2.a3, 
Modulusprime]==0,Goto[begin],nil;]; 
      u=Mod[a1.x1 ,prime]; 
      v=Mod[InverseMatrix[x1,prime].a2.x2,prime]; 
      w=Mod[InverseMatrix[x2,prime].a3,prime]; 
      dB1=RandomDiagonalMatrix[dim,prime]; 
      dB2=RandomDiagonalMatrix[dim,prime]; 
      dY1=RandomDiagonalMatrix[dim,prime]; 
      dY2=RandomDiagonalMatrix[dim,prime]; 
      y1=ConjugateMatrix[dY1,P,prime]; 
      y2=ConjugateMatrix[dY2,Q,prime]; 
      If[Det[y1.y2, 
Modulusprime]==0,Goto[begin],nil;]; 
      b1=ConjugateMatrix[dB1,R,prime]; 
      b2=ConjugateMatrix[dB2,S,prime]; 
      b3=RandomMatrix[dim,prime]; 
      If[Det[b1.b2.b3, 
Modulusprime]==0,Goto[begin],nil;]; 
      p=Mod[b1.y1 ,prime]; 
      q=Mod[InverseMatrix[y1,prime].b2.y2,prime]; 
      r=Mod[InverseMatrix[y2,prime].b3,prime]; 
      Kalice= Mod[a1.p.a2.q.a3.r,prime]; 
      Kbob= Mod[u.b1.v.b2.w.b3,prime]; 
(* From here on the encryption routine *) 
      msg=RandomMatrix[dim,prime]; 
      cif=ConjugateMatrix[msg,Kbob,prime];  
rec=ConjugateMatrix[cif,InverseMatrix[Kalice,prime] 
 ,prime]; 
     ]; 
    },{TimesToRepeat}],T1=TimeUsed[]}; 
 
LAST SESSION PRINTING SOURCE 
 
Print[" --------------------------------------------
-------"]; 
Print[" Matrix dimension (dim)   = ",dim]; 
Print[" Prime modulus (prime)    = ",prime]; 
Print[" Number of Sessions       = ",TimesToRepeat]; 
Print[" Mean session time (sec)  = ",TimesPerCycle];    
Print[" Sessions singularity corrections needed = ",  
  (trials/TimesToRepeat).100," percent"];  
Print[" "]; 
Print[" Ongoing, the last computed session is 
presented."]; 
Print[" "]; 
Print[" Random public eigenvectors -----------------
--------"]; 
{Print[" P (for A2,Y1) = ",M[P]],Print[" Q (for 
A3,Y2) = ",M[Q]]}; 
{Print[" R (for B1,X1) = ",M[R]],Print[" S (for 
B2,X2) = ",M[S]]}; 
Print[" Random ALICE private eigenvalues -----------
--------"]; 
{Print[" dA2 = ",M[dA2]],Print[" dA3 = ",M[dA3]]}; 
{Print[" dX1 = ",M[dX1]],Print[" dX2 = ",M[dX2]]}; 
Print[" ALICE private auxiliary---------------------
-------"]; 
{Print[" x1 = ",M[x1]],Print[" x2 = ",M[x2]]}; 
Print[" ALICE private keys -------------------------
-------"]; 
{Print[" a1 = ",M[a1]],Print[" a2 = ",M[a2]],Print[" 
a3 = ",M[a3]]}; 
Print[" ALICE public keys (=token for BOB:{u,v,w}---
-------"]; 
{Print[" u = ",M[u]],Print[" v = ",M[v]],Print[" w = 
",M[w]]}; 
Print[" Random BOB private eigenvalues -------------
--------"]; 
{Print[" dB1 = ",M[dB1]],Print[" dB2 = ",M[dB2]]}; 
{Print[" dY1 = ",M[dY1]],Print[" dY2 = ",M[dY2]]}; 
Print[" BOB private auxiliary-----------------------
-------"]; 
{Print[" Y1 = ",M[y1]],Print[" Y2 = ",M[y2]]}; 
Print[" BOB private keys ---------------------------
-------"]; 
{Print[" b1 = ",M[b1]],Print[" b2 = ",M[b2]],Print[" 
b3 = ",M[b3]]}; 
Print[" BOB public keys (=token for ALICE:{p,q,r}---
------"]; 
{Print[" p = ",M[p]],Print[" q = ",M[q]],Print[" r = 
",M[r]]}; 
Print[" ALICE & BOB (identical) session 
keys/conjugators--"]; 
{Print[" Kalice = ",M[Kalice]],Print[" Kbob   = 
",M[Kbob]]}; 
Print[" PKE (BCSP) session--------------------------
------"]; 
Print[" BOB selected msg = "M[msg]]; 
Print[" Encrypted msg = "M[cif]]; 
Print[" ALICE recovered msg = "M[rec]]; 
Print[" --------------------------------------------
------"]; 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
LAST SESSION OUTPUT  
 
------------------------------------------- 
Matrix dimension (dim) = 8 
Prime modulus (prime)  = 251 
Number of Sessions     = 1000 
Mean session time (sec)= 0.001968` 
Sessions singularity repair needed = 0.1% 
------------------------------------------- 
 
Random public eigenvectors ---------------- 
P (for A2,Y1) =  
   {{118, 87, 80, 104, 185, 139, 159, 46}, 
   {154, 244, 21, 132, 150, 119, 37, 202}, 
   {209, 129, 161, 232, 12, 95, 13, 117}, 
   {146, 223, 33, 122, 12, 173, 170, 205}, 
   {27, 229, 5, 186, 217, 136, 13, 9}, 
   {25, 179, 38, 239, 172, 50, 125, 108}, 
   {176, 112, 200, 108, 145, 171, 76, 100}, 
   {2, 45, 164, 12, 201, 73, 154, 199}} 
Q (for A3,Y2) =  
   {{249, 119, 144, 39, 171, 239, 154, 249}, 
   {205, 165, 39, 7, 76, 121, 22, 44}, 
   {235, 42, 74, 189, 25, 123, 58, 42}, 
   {162, 108, 52, 101, 126, 69, 10, 217}, 
   {226, 225, 56, 178, 206, 145, 217, 113}, 
   {10, 191, 141, 66, 5, 30, 94, 91}, 
   {90, 129, 91, 230, 47, 156, 35, 148}, 
   {73, 63, 127, 91, 40, 201, 139, 133}} 
R (for B1,X1) =  
   {{35, 46, 161, 77, 163, 16, 49, 12}, 
   {244, 187, 177, 46, 169, 186, 198, 164}, 
   {105, 78, 198, 72, 188, 30, 14, 241}, 
   {195, 69, 14, 241, 52, 18, 114, 130}, 
   {186, 129, 205, 26, 229, 232, 207, 205}, 
   {186, 83, 244, 163, 215, 29, 12, 237}, 
   {238, 99, 79, 37, 32, 91, 248, 96}, 
   {13, 169, 7, 195, 25, 228, 50, 127}} 
S (for B2,X2) =  
   {{39, 8, 145, 170, 38, 159, 197, 118}, 
   {41, 66, 220, 106, 243, 52, 50, 114}, 
   {9, 7, 128, 145, 113, 137, 184, 228}, 
   {214, 126, 35, 170, 49, 38, 249, 230}, 
   {170, 81, 136, 8, 98, 92, 175, 7}, 
   {119, 71, 173, 142, 247, 91, 146, 168}, 
   {191, 214, 36, 44, 82, 211, 199, 2}, 
   {105, 32, 206, 102, 27, 76, 139, 198}} 
Random ALICE private eigenvalues -------- 
dA2 =  
   {{39, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, 
   {0, 56, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, 
   {0, 0, 214, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, 
   {0, 0, 0, 120, 0, 0, 0, 0}, 
   {0, 0, 0, 0, 97, 0, 0, 0}, 
   {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 56, 0, 0}, 
   {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 110, 0}, 
   {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 87}}} 
dA3 = 
   {{250, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, 
   {0, 214, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, 
   {0, 0, 226, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, 
   {0, 0, 0, 16, 0, 0, 0, 0}, 
   {0, 0, 0, 0, 26, 0, 0, 0}, 
   {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 186, 0, 0}, 
   {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 22, 0}, 
   {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 248}} 
dX1 =  
   {{62, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, 
   {0, 46, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, 
   {0, 0, 10, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, 
   {0, 0, 0, 80, 0, 0, 0, 0}, 
   {0, 0, 0, 0, 88, 0, 0, 0}, 
   {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 175, 0, 0}, 
   {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 195, 0}, 
   {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 28}} 
 
 
dX2 =  
   {{230, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, 
   {0, 209, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, 
   {0, 0, 186, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, 
   {0, 0, 0, 31, 0, 0, 0, 0}, 
   {0, 0, 0, 0, 236, 0, 0, 0}, 
   {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 31, 0, 0}, 
   {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 241, 0}, 
   {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 117}} 
 
ALICE private auxiliary------------------ 
x1 =  
   {{185, 177, 6, 133, 82, 219, 154, 65}, 
   {160, 161, 244, 214, 15, 99, 58, 81}, 
   {63, 24, 105, 6, 116, 131, 213, 28}, 
   {185, 23, 148, 104, 148, 95, 40, 109}, 
   {182, 144, 0, 191, 5, 230, 179, 206}, 
   {216, 235, 144, 109, 170, 177, 234, 159}, 
   {13, 214, 202, 190, 209, 100, 229, 78}, 
   {39, 135, 206, 239, 29, 145, 5, 220}} 
x2 =  
   {130, 56, 107, 168, 26, 102, 76, 27}, 
   {140, 71, 189, 9, 211, 248, 64, 199}, 
   {197, 207, 146, 173, 121, 54, 49, 165}, 
   {159, 139, 163, 40, 76, 232, 15, 242}, 
   {50, 91, 127, 81, 154, 242, 80, 228}, 
   {28, 75, 51, 213, 126, 145, 166, 212}, 
   {146, 26, 53, 16, 11, 32, 24, 32}, 
   {44, 236, 139, 214, 53, 100, 164, 69}} 
ALICE private keys ----------------------- 
a1 = 
   {82, 187, 30, 241, 138, 17, 139, 234}, 
   {138, 221, 8, 88, 14, 226, 200, 110}, 
   {5, 151, 124, 207, 119, 38, 86, 96}, 
   {5, 248, 171, 240, 43, 10, 147, 164}, 
   {100, 123, 237, 224, 53, 57, 185, 143}, 
   {107, 13, 45, 90, 45, 191, 17, 188}, 
   {42, 147, 60, 95, 75, 157, 235, 157}, 
   {82, 58, 89, 222, 86, 205, 20, 38}} 
a2 =  
   {{221, 163, 237, 236, 25, 117, 236, 30}, 
   {53, 50, 223, 72, 124, 31, 45, 136}, 
   {151, 82, 154, 14, 120, 110, 69, 16}, 
   {115, 65, 61, 114, 16, 26, 203, 70}, 
   {236, 93, 237, 33, 175, 113, 237, 46}, 
   {185, 192, 24, 203, 58, 132, 59, 8}, 
   {169, 199, 85, 126, 229, 210, 45, 191}, 
   {141, 134, 123, 0, 229, 227, 72, 139}} 
  a3 =  
   {{63, 41, 113, 40, 99, 102, 22, 156}, 
   {1, 128, 57, 143, 48, 49, 157, 100}, 
   {43, 68, 23, 245, 109, 22, 158, 217}, 
   {5, 223, 161, 138, 0, 67, 218, 33}, 
   {113, 211, 77, 96, 165, 181, 209, 148}, 
   {136, 156, 168, 192, 100, 60, 205, 88}, 
   {81, 174, 184, 104, 209, 164, 16, 25}, 
   {74, 68, 154, 209, 131, 184, 225, 93}} 
 
ALICE public keys (=token for BOB:{u,v,w}--- 
u =  
   {{13, 45, 16, 222, 244, 44, 32, 228}, 
   {137, 52, 66, 33, 117, 121, 223, 96}, 
   {249, 3, 160, 173, 208, 137, 211, 89}, 
   {117, 129, 223, 30, 245, 6, 26, 170}, 
   {246, 4, 33, 156, 215, 79, 41, 185}, 
   {218, 149, 161, 54, 184, 85, 149, 250}, 
   {200, 43, 17, 4, 225, 165, 44, 228}, 
   {22, 161, 92, 201, 223, 46, 17, 63}} 
v =  
   {{151, 241, 216, 80, 197, 30, 29, 56}, 
   {57, 32, 151, 200, 39, 9, 196, 90}, 
   {0, 16, 104, 112, 88, 184, 128, 126}, 
   {32, 167, 46, 6, 211, 248, 67, 61}, 
   {2, 136, 41, 207, 181, 241, 210, 112}, 
   {157, 167, 14, 226, 34, 131, 13, 202}, 
   {165, 225, 89, 144, 70, 143, 104, 199}, 
   {43, 54, 47, 76, 58, 76, 218, 217}} 
 
  
 
w =  
   {{112, 5, 86, 148, 45, 217, 142, 68}, 
   {0, 203, 179, 25, 32, 185, 160, 98}, 
   {10, 97, 83, 114, 6, 145, 118, 156}, 
   {96, 41, 30, 93, 184, 109, 115, 59}, 
   {0, 224, 44, 104, 128, 191, 142, 91}, 
   {157, 49, 41, 196, 73, 58, 191, 72}, 
   {200, 231, 240, 0, 96, 209, 45, 124}, 
   {22, 4, 201, 127, 151, 31, 108, 68}} 
Random BOB private eigenvalues ---------- 
dB1 =  
   {{125, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, 
   {0, 103, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, 
   {0, 0, 197, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, 
   {0, 0, 0, 99, 0, 0, 0, 0}, 
   {0, 0, 0, 0, 29, 0, 0, 0}, 
   {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 178, 0, 0}, 
   {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 45, 0}, 
   {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 56}} 
dB2 =  
   {{117, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, 
   {0, 6, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, 
   {0, 0, 191, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, 
   {0, 0, 0, 82, 0, 0, 0, 0}, 
   {0, 0, 0, 0, 148, 0, 0, 0}, 
   {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 78, 0, 0}, 
   {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 244, 0}, 
   {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 247}} 
dY1 =  
   {{215, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, 
   {0, 142, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, 
   {0, 0, 12, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, 
   {0, 0, 0, 123, 0, 0, 0, 0}, 
   {0, 0, 0, 0, 241, 0, 0, 0}, 
   {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 234, 0, 0}, 
   {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 84, 0}, 
   {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 13}} 
dY2 =  
   {{11, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, 
   {0, 77, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, 
   {0, 0, 95, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, 
   {0, 0, 0, 145, 0, 0, 0, 0}, 
   {0, 0, 0, 0, 172, 0, 0, 0}, 
   {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 162, 0, 0}, 
   {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 235, 0}, 
   {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 40}} 
BOB private auxiliary------------------- 
Y1 =  
   {{103, 68, 213, 144, 111, 124, 138, 81}, 
   {195, 112, 28, 130, 186, 165, 11, 108}, 
   {57, 207, 123, 113, 41, 250, 110, 162}, 
   {154, 5, 58, 163, 104, 127, 80, 14}, 
   {80, 238, 220, 173, 122, 216, 155, 159}, 
   {88, 23, 149, 110, 197, 226, 119, 202}, 
   {135, 109, 47, 28, 23, 91, 134, 154}, 
   {163, 19, 71, 107, 235, 187, 187, 81}} 
Y2 =  
   {{143, 44, 16, 226, 219, 211, 247, 34}, 
   {119, 246, 212, 130, 139, 29, 128, 226}, 
   {115, 231, 80, 30, 164, 204, 17, 167}, 
   {6, 5, 7, 169, 80, 246, 232, 246}, 
   {7, 240, 220, 162, 32, 93, 213, 9}, 
   {176, 146, 74, 187, 141, 229, 155, 181}, 
   {152, 108, 10, 77, 11, 249, 195, 227}, 
   {237, 145, 67, 33, 124, 130, 14, 94}} 
BOB private keys -------------------------- 
b1 =  
   {{110, 36, 153, 231, 129, 169, 61, 132}, 
   {169, 199, 2, 96, 180, 10, 242, 194}, 
   {113, 138, 30, 161, 50, 42, 16, 48}, 
   {229, 80, 105, 44, 10, 146, 213, 63}, 
   {80, 168, 216, 230, 36, 151, 180, 94}, 
   {166, 2, 111, 250, 81, 182, 46, 13}, 
   {45, 194, 235, 16, 202, 126, 106, 31}, 
   {106, 110, 205, 91, 190, 54, 218, 125}} 
 
 
 
b2 =  
   {{115, 14, 121, 94, 8, 143, 86, 207}, 
   {15, 144, 96, 91, 111, 24, 190, 201}, 
   {83, 218, 53, 165, 205, 60, 223, 72}, 
   {42, 46, 72, 4, 69, 79, 56, 10}, 
   {68, 15, 59, 113, 96, 48, 137, 114}, 
   {65, 10, 51, 38, 14, 172, 190, 4}, 
   {20, 144, 218, 18, 27, 20, 9, 52}, 
   {175, 226, 234, 20, 245, 32, 201, 18}} 
b3 =  
   {{52, 14, 114, 160, 182, 49, 74, 113}, 
   {228, 167, 208, 164, 46, 86, 205, 219}, 
   {18, 51, 40, 202, 18, 174, 96, 191}, 
   {38, 17, 40, 22, 188, 65, 174, 185}, 
   {47, 70, 17, 49, 12, 4, 134, 236}, 
   {57, 180, 82, 103, 250, 29, 148, 148}, 
   {176, 32, 31, 7, 97, 66, 79, 39}, 
   {67, 161, 100, 125, 24, 237, 218, 42}} 
BOB public keys (=token for ALICE:{p,q,r}--- 
p =  
   {{120, 234, 218, 175, 137, 230, 107, 93}, 
   {82, 129, 169, 103, 114, 12, 185, 242}, 
   {154, 246, 131, 120, 130, 73, 183, 243}, 
   {204, 84, 4, 38, 223, 198, 124, 99}, 
   {197, 153, 28, 164, 243, 177, 66, 111}, 
   {19, 208, 146, 215, 53, 79, 58, 54}, 
   {17, 86, 38, 243, 123, 183, 124, 242}, 
   {65, 230, 120, 100, 81, 49, 97, 209}} 
 
q =  
   {{43, 149, 88, 213, 211, 66, 168, 142}, 
   {56, 47, 70, 201, 94, 154, 65, 138}, 
   {134, 151, 195, 64, 108, 99, 199, 208}, 
   {0, 239, 107, 125, 206, 213, 28, 90}, 
   {90, 44, 202, 98, 184, 24, 78, 108}, 
   {64, 199, 60, 218, 248, 109, 84, 44}, 
   {85, 106, 117, 36, 50, 238, 166, 66}, 
   {202, 187, 161, 50, 41, 246, 242, 6} 
r =  
   {{237, 165, 140, 101, 132, 233, 82, 227}, 
   {25, 92, 181, 209, 180, 26, 41, 235}, 
   {32, 24, 123, 58, 178, 237, 136, 190}, 
   {47, 39, 123, 86, 54, 69, 197, 168}, 
   {57, 144, 210, 177, 123, 19, 74, 153}, 
   {2, 111, 18, 81, 185, 218, 191, 128}, 
   {159, 100, 142, 53, 13, 154, 69, 171}, 
   {233, 88, 194, 241, 143, 98, 54, 53}} 
ALICE & BOB (identical) keys or conjugators-- 
Kalice =  
   {{142, 192, 38, 42, 56, 123, 248, 215}, 
   {86, 89, 216, 109, 223, 54, 66, 135}, 
   {88, 206, 63, 134, 249, 39, 87, 2}, 
   {217, 202, 79, 240, 131, 61, 13, 213}, 
   {62, 67, 72, 46, 219, 51, 113, 100}, 
   {17, 234, 189, 210, 242, 230, 86, 193}, 
   {246, 157, 234, 27, 124, 138, 23, 127}, 
   {131, 35, 240, 116, 190, 144, 174, 90}} 
Kbob   =  
   {{142, 192, 38, 42, 56, 123, 248, 215}, 
   {86, 89, 216, 109, 223, 54, 66, 135}, 
   {88, 206, 63, 134, 249, 39, 87, 2}, 
   {217, 202, 79, 240, 131, 61, 13, 213}, 
   {62, 67, 72, 46, 219, 51, 113, 100}, 
   {17, 234, 189, 210, 242, 230, 86, 193}, 
   {246, 157, 234, 27, 124, 138, 23, 127}, 
   {131, 35, 240, 116, 190, 144, 174, 90}} 
------------------------------------------- 
UNTIL HERE IT WORKS AS A D-H KE. 
FOLLOWING IS A BCSP BASED ENCRYPTION. 
------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PKE (BCSP) session------------------------- 
BOB selected msg =  
   {{38, 50, 241, 209, 242, 186, 128, 113}, 
   {200, 43, 145, 57, 52, 145, 76, 229}, 
   {78, 58, 70, 144, 45, 161, 100, 101}, 
   {223, 117, 213, 2, 184, 236, 91, 245}, 
   {136, 160, 210, 11, 197, 44, 239, 54}, 
   {233, 226, 126, 139, 7, 246, 165, 48}, 
   {140, 135, 172, 34, 37, 183, 21, 202}, 
   {176, 130, 203, 141, 49, 0, 161, 5}} 
Encrypted msg =  
   {{7, 41, 3, 224, 146, 175, 243, 114}, 
   {168, 22, 11, 103, 83, 91, 24, 179}, 
   {113, 16, 19, 249, 128, 231, 87, 176}, 
   {122, 183, 20, 2, 219, 96, 229, 144}, 
   {46, 30, 198, 139, 4, 240, 27, 56}, 
   {146, 5, 221, 58, 234, 184, 77, 191}, 
   {212, 241, 48, 5, 23, 40, 150, 21}, 
   {144, 12, 79, 177, 154, 45, 115, 234}} 
ALICE recovered msg =  
   {{38, 50, 241, 209, 242, 186, 128, 113}, 
   {200, 43, 145, 57, 52, 145, 76, 229}, 
   {78, 58, 70, 144, 45, 161, 100, 101}, 
   {223, 117, 213, 2, 184, 236, 91, 245}, 
   {136, 160, 210, 11, 197, 44, 239, 54}, 
   {233, 226, 126, 139, 7, 246, 165, 48}, 
   {140, 135, 172, 34, 37, 183, 21, 202}, 
   {176, 130, 203, 141, 49, 0, 161, 5}} 
------------------------------------------- 
 
